Investment thesisEquityPayments
Mastercard logo

MA

Mastercard

Deliberate exposure away from AI and compute: a toll on payment volume.

Portfolio weight

5.13%

As of August 20, 2026

Diversification, on purpose

Mastercard gives the portfolio exposure away from the AI and compute theme. That is the primary reason it is here. Most of the book's risk is tied to one capex cycle, and a business whose revenue tracks consumer and commercial payment volume is driven by something largely unrelated.

Network economics and payment volume

The appeal is margins, network economics, and the long-term ability to compound alongside increasing total payment volume. Mastercard takes a small fee on volume crossing its network and carries almost no incremental cost per transaction, which is why operating margin sits where it does.

Cross-border volume carries materially better economics than domestic transactions and is the most cyclical part of the mix, since it moves with travel and global commerce. Switched volume growth is the line that shows whether the network is gaining or losing share of spend.

What the risk actually is

The network itself is genuinely hard to replicate, so competitive displacement isn't the real bear case. The real risk is regulatory pressure on interchange and scheme fees, plus the slow emergence of account-to-account rails that bypass card networks. Neither moves quickly, but both compress the toll rather than the volume. That's why operating margin, not payment volume, is the line to watch.

Reported financials

Financial data through Q2 2026

Net revenue

SEC XBRL

Financial data through Q2 2026 · SEC XBRL: Revenues. Q4 derived as the fiscal-year total less the other three quarters, since XBRL has no standalone Q4 duration.

Revenue growth (YoY)

SEC XBRL

Financial data through Q2 2026 · Year-over-year change, same quarter prior year, from SEC-reported figures.

Operating margin

SEC XBRL

Financial data through Q2 2026 · Computed from SEC-reported operatingIncome ÷ revenue.

Relative valuation

Valuation updated August 2026

Forward P/E

Valuation data pending

Direct-peer average

Pending

Versus its own history

Historical forward-P/E series pending. Maintained by hand in data/fundamentals/manual.ts. No free, reliable source exists for consensus estimates, so nothing is inferred here.

Direct peers

used in the average

Similar enough that comparing multiples is meaningful.

V

V

Visa

100% similar

fwd P/E pending

same business modeloverlapping productssame revenue model
AXP

AXP

American Express

73% similar

fwd P/E pending

same business modelsame revenue modelsimilar capital intensity
PYPL

PYPL

PayPal

73% similar

fwd P/E pending

same business modelsame revenue modelsimilar capital intensity

Strategic competitors

never averaged

Competing for the same customers or budget, but too different financially for their multiple to say much about this holding.

MercadoLibre logo

MELI

MercadoLibre

34% similar

fwd P/E pending

same revenue modelsame customer typesimilar capital intensity

Excluded from peer average: competes for the same demand, but a different financial profile

Selected by weighted similarity across business model, revenue model, products, end markets, customer type, capital intensity, growth, margins and geography. Direct peers score ≥55% and sit within 2 diversification steps; only they feed the peer average.